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Internationalized Regimes:  
A Second Dimension of Regime Hybridity  
 
Oisín Tansey  
 
 
Abstract 
Traditional approaches have conceptualized political regimes almost exclusively with 
reference to domestic-level political factors. However, many current and historical 
political regimes have entailed a major role for international actors, and in some cases the 
external influence has been so great that regimes have become internationalized. This 
article explores the concept of ‘internationalized regimes’ and argues that they should be 
seen as a distinct form of hybrid regime type that demonstrates a distinct dimension of 
hybridity. Until now, regime hybridity has been conceived along a single dimension of 
domestic politics: the level of competitiveness. Yet, some regimes are characterized by a 
different type of hybridity, in which domestic and international authority are found 
together within a single political system. The article explores the dynamics of 
internationalized regimes within three settings, those of international occupation, 
international administration and informal empire.  
 
Keywords: regime type, hybrid regimes, occupation, state-building, 
internationalization  
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Domestic politics is rarely entirely domestic. Few political systems are entirely 
independent of their international surroundings, and international actors and 
environments frequently influence national political debates and developments. In recent 
years, the international dimensions of democratization have received extensive attention, 
and a wide variety of external influences have been identified.1 However, there has been 
less attention in the literature on regime change to the role that international actors can 
play in post-transition politics. In many cases, international actors do not just influence 
the timing or direction of regime change, they also find ways to insert themselves into 
the political process over prolonged periods of time. For example, US officials exercised 
considerable political authority in Iraq after 2003, while multilateral interventions in 
Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor in the 1990s were followed in each case by prolonged 
and intrusive efforts at external governance. These cases echo earlier experiences in 
countries such as Germany and Japan where outside powers exercised extensive political 
authority over many years.  
Cases such as these do not fit easily into existing typologies of political regimes. 
Traditionally, democracies have been distinguished from non-democratic regimes with 
reference to the rules governing access to power and political decision-making. More 
recently, the focus on hybrid regimes has highlighted the blurred boundaries that exist 
between democratic and authoritarian regimes, as countries exhibit democratic 
institutions and characteristics even as leaders seek to subvert democracy and limit 
political rights and freedoms.2 These efforts at conceptualizing political regimes have had 
in common a focus on the manner in which national governments govern society, and 
have focused exclusively on domestic actors and institutions. However, many political 
regimes are distinctive not because of the nature of domestic governance, but because of 
the international identity of those doing the governing. When external actors assume 
positions of authority at the domestic level and insert themselves into the heart of the 
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political system in comprehensive and intrusive ways, the political regime that emerges 
ceases to be purely domestic. This article is concerned with identifying this separate class 
of ‘internationalized regimes’, in which international actors play a direct role in the 
political system. These internationalized regimes exhibit a different form of hybridity 
from that which has been the subject of so much recent research, as they combine 
elements of domestic and international authority that existing typologies of political 
regimes have largely assumed to be separate.  
The identification of a category of internationalized regimes has both conceptual 
and theoretical benefits. Conceptually, it addresses a gap in existing treatments of regime 
type by going beyond the use of domestic criteria of concept formation and using a 
combination of domestic and international factors. In doing so, it facilitates the 
classification of a range of cases that do not fit easily into existing typologies of regime 
type. Theoretically, it enables the development of new theory concerning the impact of 
regime type on other aspects of political development. Existing approaches have shown 
how the nature of regime type has implications for regime duration and regime 
transition.3 Some regimes, for example, contain within them incentive and organisational 
structures that make them more or less likely to endure, and more or less likely to be 
followed by democracy. While this article is primarily concerned with identifying and 
exploring the concept of internationalized regimes, it concludes by pointing to possible 
ways in which the concept may be useful in developing new theory about regime 
duration and transition. 
 
 
Defining internationalized regimes 
Traditional approaches have conceptualized political regimes almost exclusively with 
reference to domestic-level political factors. The characteristics that vary between them 
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and that are used to differentiate between subtypes are usually domestic characteristics 
such as rules concerning leadership succession and decision-making procedures, as well 
as levels of political openness. Although there is no consensus regarding the definition of 
a political regime, Gerardo Munck has identified a common set of attributes found in the 
literature that suggest political regimes are understood to entail the core rules and 
procedures that determine three key political features:  
1) the number and type of actors who are allowed to gain access to government 
power, 
2) the methods of access to such positions, and,  
3) the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions.4 
Around this core set of elements, several different typologies of political regimes have 
emerged that identify a wide range of potential regime types, with the classic categories 
of democracy, authoritarianism and totalitarianism being supplemented by an extensive 
list of alternatives.5  
An influential approach in recent regime analysis, however, seeks to question the 
boundaries between regime categories rather than add to them. Moving away from 
traditional distinctions between democratic and non-democratic regime types, recent 
work has identified a range of new ‘hybrid regimes’ that straddle the conventional divides 
and combine elements of democratic and non-democratic political systems. Levitsky and 
Way, for example, have highlighted how ‘competitive authoritarianism’ combines the 
existence of formal institutions of democracy with a level of incumbent abuse of power 
that prevents the realisation of full democratic standards. Diamond identifies a broader 
category of ‘pseudo-democracies’ and distinguishes between competitive authoritarian 
regimes and ‘hegemonic’ regimes, where competitiveness is low but some political 
opposition is permitted as long as there is no serious challenge to the incumbent 
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authorities.6 Other hybrid regimes identified in the literature include electoral 
authoritarian regimes,7 illiberal democracies,8 and defective democracies.9 
Yet all these recent approaches share a common pattern of defining hybrid regimes 
with reference to their domestic characteristics. Hybridity is conceived along a single 
dimension concerning the domestic features of the regime, so that a regime is a hybrid 
one if it combines democratic and non-democratic elements at the national level. This 
article, however, argues that regime type can also be evaluated along a second dimension 
of hybridity, in which the hybrid nature of the political system derives from the 
combination of domestic and international features. In these settings, domestic and 
international actors interact in a sustained fashion that fundamentally shapes the nature 
of domestic politics, and leads to distinctive forms of political regime type.  
The effort to identify this distinctive set of regimes builds on a well-established 
tradition of examining the international dimensions of regime change.10 The literature on 
regime change has included extensive consideration of the role of international factors, 
including democracy assistance,11 conditionality,12 international diffusion13 and 
international intervention14. Most recently, Levitsky and Way have reignited debates 
about the role of international influences on regime change by distinguishing between 
two core categories of external variables, namely international ‘leverage and linkage’.15 
However, much of this attention has focused on the international influence on regime 
change, and there is much less attention to the ways in which international factors can 
shape and help constitute regime type. This article seeks to elaborate on this latter form of 
influence, and addresses particular regime types that do not rest purely on domestic 
political characteristics, but that are shaped in significant part by their international 
features.16 
Internationalized regimes are thus defined here as political systems in which the core 
elements of the regime – the rules and control over access to power and political 
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decision-making – are constituted in significant part by international as well as domestic 
actors. In these regimes, international actors directly control key functions of 
government and have the ability to wield legislative and executive authority. 
Consequently, international actors co-exist with domestic actors in positions of political 
authority and play an integral role in determining the nature of the regime. These are not 
regimes that are simply vulnerable to international influence, but are rather regimes that 
entail sustained and intrusive involvement of international actors within the political 
system itself. Examples of internationalized regimes include recent cases of international 
occupation and administration such as Iraq and Bosnia, in which states or international 
organizations assume a direct governing role in domestic politics, as well as cases of 
informal empire such as the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War, where outside powers 
exercise control over domestic authority from a distance.  
Many forms of international influence and linkage to domestic politics exist, and 
internationalized regimes can also be contrasted with other forms of international 
influence in order to draw out their distinctiveness. They differ from cases of 
government or regime overthrow, which also include intensive international intervention, 
but do not include a sustained role for international actors in regulating regime politics 
over time.17 They differ from cases of annexation, in which pre-existing regimes cease to 
have any continuing role and are subsumed into the political regime of a separate state.18 
They can also be distinguished from cases in which a government is ‘propped up’ by 
outside powers, through some form of military or economic support. Such cases clearly 
entail a crucial political role for outside actors, but such actors do not directly control the 
domestic political regime, and do not shape its core features.  
These cases can also be contrasted to situations in which international forces such as 
globalisation and international liberalisation shape domestic politics. Keohane and Milner 
have written about ‘internationalization and domestic politics’, and specifically the ways 
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in which international structures associated with the world economy have implications 
for national economies in terms of actor preferences and economic policies.19 Such 
processes of economic internationalization are often associated with patterns of 
international capitalism that have indirect influences on domestic politics (e.g. trade flows 
and exchange rate fluctuations), in that they do not reflect active and conscious efforts to 
increase international control over domestic politics, and they are thus distinct from the 
dynamics present in the internationalized regimes discussed here, which entail active and 
intentional intervention in domestic affairs by international actors.  
Even when some aspects of economic internationalization do include active and 
intentional intervention in domestic politics, these dynamics remain distinct from the 
processes taking place in internationalized regimes. For example, international financial 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European 
Central Bank sometimes pursue intentional and intrusive economic policies that lead to 
the exercise of international authority at the domestic level, for example through the use 
of policy conditionality in the context of financial loads, or international economic 
monitoring in the wake of economic bailouts seen in European countries such as Greece 
and Ireland in 2010/11.20 Yet, while such intervention can be highly intrusive and can 
have implications for national sovereignty, it falls short of the internationalization of the 
entire political regime. National policy may be constrained, and indeed entire policy areas 
may effectively be internationalized, but the core elements of the political regime in 
terms of the rules governing access to power and political decision-making remain in 
domestic hands.  
There are many forms of international influence in domestic politics, many of them 
highly intrusive. Despite the assumptions of some influential theories of international 
politics, the world clearly displays patterns of ‘hierarchy’ across many issue areas and in 
many relationships among different types of international actors.21 Internationalized 
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regimes reflect one dimension of such patterns, relating to the internationalization of the 
political regime rather than a given policy area. In these settings, international actors 
control the central elements of the full domestic political regime, and thus 
internationalize the political system in ways not seen in other settings.  
Furthermore, the combination of domestic and international authority in these 
settings suggests that they are best viewed as a form of hybrid regime, although they 
differ in nature from the types of hybrid regimes that have been the subject of recent 
scholarship. The conventional hybrid regimes that have proliferated since the end of the 
Cold War are hybrid due to their combination of traditionally separate political attributes 
– democratic and authoritarian political rule. This type of hybridity is essentially about 
the nature of domestic politics and levels of political freedom and competition at the 
national level, or what I call ‘domestic hybridity’. Internationalized regimes, on the other 
hand, are hybrid for a separate reason. Their distinctiveness rests on a second dimension 
of hybridity, along which they combine usually separate elements of domestic and 
international politics, rather than combining usually separate elements of domestic 
politics alone. I call this form of interaction ‘international hybridity’.  
Table 1 compares the two forms of hybridity and highlights the ways in which they 
can interact. The top row distinguishes between domestic hybridity and two pure forms 
of domestic regime type – democracy and authoritarianism. The left-hand column 
distinguishes between international hybridity and the pure alternative of a fully domestic 
regime. When a regime is purely domestic, the regime options are the traditional mix of 
democratic, authoritarian and (domestic) hybrid. As seen in the bottom row of Table 1, 
however, when a regime is internationalized there are a range of relatively unexplored 
regime options.  
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Table 1: The Two Dimensions of Hybridity22 
 
Domestic  
Hybridity 
 
 
International Hybridity 
Pure 
Democracy 
Pure 
Authoritarianism  
Democratic/Authoritarian 
Hybrid 
Pure Domestic Regime Conventional 
democracy  
Conventional 
authoritarianism  
Conventional hybrid regime 
 
E.g. Levitsky and Way’s 
competitive authoritarianism  
Domestic/International  
Hybrid 
Unlikely to 
exist  
Authoritarian 
internationalized 
regime  
 
E.g. Soviet Bloc  
Competitive 
internationalized regime  
 
 
E.g. Germany, Japan, 
Kosovo, Bosnia, East 
Timor, Iraq  
 
 
First, it is clear that it is difficult to combine international hybridity with democracy – 
once a regime is internationalized, the channels of representation and accountability that 
link citizens to rulers break down, and democracy becomes challenging to attain. Unless 
international actors subject themselves to the key mechanisms of democratic 
accountability – especially elections – democratic government will be almost impossible. 
Internationalized regimes are, thus, very unlikely to be democratic, and in practice 
international interveners in cases such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq have not allowed 
themselves to be voted out of office by the domestic populations over which they have 
assumed authority.  
It is perfectly possible, however, for an internationalized regime to be fully 
authoritarian. If the international authorities restrict political contestation and 
participation, and preclude democratic accountability even for domestic actors, then the 
regime will simply be an ‘authoritarian internationalized regime’. This pattern was clearly 
seen after World War II, when the Soviet Union controlled its satellite states in Central 
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and Eastern Europe and actively restricted the expression of democratic politics in 
favour of repressive single party rule.  
The final category is arguably the most interesting, where both forms of hybridity are 
simultaneously present. In these settings, regimes combine elements of domestic and 
international politics on one hand, while on the other hand exhibiting elements of 
democratic and authoritarian politics. The result is a double-hybrid – an internationalized 
regime that is neither purely democratic nor authoritarian. I call these cases ‘competitive 
internationalized regimes’. These regime types are most common when the international 
actors are seeking to promote democratic government, with the result that their presence 
is combined with democratic institutions and policies. There are many examples of such 
political regimes in recent history, not least because of the rise of the democracy 
promotion agenda and increasing levels of international interventionism. One of clearest 
contemporary examples is Bosnia, which since the Dayton Agreement of 1995, has been 
subject to a highly authoritative international presence, in the form of the Office of the 
High Representative, while also enjoying robust levels of political competition and 
participation.23 While Bosnia has had several free and fair elections in the post-Dayton 
period, with alteration in domestic governments, the continued international presence 
precludes the attainment of pure democracy. Other examples include United Nations 
administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, and the international occupation of Iraq 
under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The post-World War II occupations of 
Germany and Japan also combined unelected international rule with efforts to promote 
political pluralism and liberal values.  
Internationalized regimes can, thus, vary in their levels of democratic quality, often 
corresponding to the democratic credentials of the intervening powers. Some 
interveners, especially western states and international organizations, have an explicit 
democracy promotion agenda and therefore seek to implement and encourage 
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democratic practices even as they pursue non-democratic methods of international 
governance. Other forms of internationalized regime, however, involve the intervention 
of external actors who have no interests in democratic government and are rather more 
concerned with restricting rather than opening up democratic politics. One of the 
common features of these cases is thus that the objectives of the interveners are 
fundamentally political in nature – international authorities usually seek to shape the 
nature of domestic politics according to their specific interests and priorities. 
One further consideration regarding the classification of internationalized regimes 
concerns their duration over time. Many cases of internationalized regimes are 
internationalized for a relatively short amount of time, while others endure over very 
long periods. This variation raises the question of whether temporary arrangements in 
which international authorities constitute the domestic regime before withdrawing should 
even be considered a regime type, rather than a transitional period between regime types.24 
In a recent treatment of hybrid regimes, Leonardo Morlino takes a relatively strict 
approach, and only categorizes as regime types those cases that have had over 10 years of 
stable regime politics. Those political systems lasting less than 10 years old are 
categorized as transitional cases.25 However, this approach is too restrictive, as it 
precludes analysis of distinct regime types that have emerged and leads to so much being 
categorized as ‘transitional’ that it stretches the very concept of regime transition.  
Furthermore, excluding such short-lived cases from regime classifications risks 
undermining efforts at theory development regarding the impact and trajectory of 
varying regime types. A recent and influential analysis of regime types and their influence 
provides a systematic analysis of the duration of different regime types, highlighting that 
while some regime types tend to last for long periods (monarchies are the most durable, 
lasting on average 25 years) others tend to be much more short lived (non-dominant 
limited multiparty regimes last on average just 5.8 years).26 Achieving this comparative 
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knowledge is only possible when regime types of very short durations are included, such 
as the military regime in Bangladesh that existed only from 1975-77, and a one-party 
regime that did not last beyond a year in Azerbijan in 1991.27 This article adopts a similar 
approach, and seeks to include even very short-term cases of internationalization as cases 
of distinctive regime types so as to contribute to our understanding of regime type 
variations and their implications.28  
The key point here is that in many cases of regime change new political arrangements 
emerge that ultimately do not consolidate into long-term conventional political regimes, 
but that are nonetheless quite stable while they last and in and of themselves represent 
distinct forms of regime politics. As long as they last, they regulate politics as all regimes 
do: by governing who gets into power and what they can do once in power. Classifying 
such political systems as transitional arrangements ignores the fact that some 
internationalized regimes have lasted many years, and consigns too much politics from 
more short-lived cases to a residual category that washes away the distinctiveness of 
political rule in these settings and limits our potential for understanding this class of 
common cases. If we include only regimes that achieve some form of stability, we may 
miss the fact that certain regime types are inherently unstable, and our theoretical 
knowledge of regime politics will be weaker as a result.  
 
 
The settings of internationalized regimes 
According to the rules of sovereign statehood, each state has the right to determine its 
own affairs and remain free from intervention from other states. However, the rules 
associated with sovereignty have routinely been breached throughout international 
history, and states have frequently intervened in each other’s domestic political affairs.29 
The forms of such international intervention range widely in their nature and levels of 
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intrusiveness.30 Some involve international involvement through arrangements that are 
voluntarily entered into by domestic political elites.31 Others are the result of coercive 
international actions and are carried out in the face of domestic resistance. Some 
international interventions involve a relatively minor external role that does not 
fundamentally change the nature of domestic politics, while others are of such magnitude 
that the nature of the domestic political regime is altered and becomes 
internationalized.32 
Internationalized regimes are, thus, not simply regimes that are subject to 
international pressure, or that are vulnerable to outside influence. They are regimes that 
are in part constituted by the actions and influence of international actors. Consequently, 
they emerge only in circumstances where the role of international actors is highly 
intrusive and where international actors are unusually interventionist. In such settings, 
the external role extends beyond conventional channels of international influence and 
entails some form of control over the nature of domestic political institutions and 
decision-making. Once international actors begin to exercise formal or informal 
executive authority at the domestic level, the political regime is not simply influenced by 
external actors, but fundamentally changes in nature and becomes internationalized. In 
these settings, international actors can play direct and influential roles in domestic regime 
politics, using a range of powerful political mechanisms that are unavailable in more 
conventional settings. Five mechanisms of influence in particular facilitate the 
internationalization of political regimes in such settings:  
- agenda-setting powers, which can enable international actors to influence which issues 
are subject to discussion;  
- veto powers, which can include the ability to strike down laws that are proposed by 
domestic actors; 
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- drafting powers, where international actors can involve themselves in drafting basic 
legislation or more significant institutional provisions;  
- imposition authority, which enables external authorities to bypass domestic actors 
entirely and enforce measures they deem necessary; 
- leadership selection, where international powers can remove domestic leaders from 
their positions of authority or veto potential leaders.  
 
This extent of international intervention in regime politics, however, only emerges under 
certain conditions. I identify three particular settings in which the level of international 
intervention is so great that a previously domestic regime becomes a hybrid 
internationalized regime. In the context of international occupation, of international 
administration, and of informal empire, the level of external involvement and control 
over domestic affairs is sufficient to systematically shape the nature of domestic politics 
and domestic political structures. These three forms of international intervention each 
provide external actors with powers that enable them to be equal or dominate the power 
of domestic political elites.  
 
 
Internat ional  occupat ion  
International occupation entails ‘the temporary control of a territory by a state (or group 
of allied states) that makes no claims to permanent sovereignty over that territory’.33 
Occupation often, but not always, follows the military victory of the occupying power 
over the occupied state, and also tends to involve a sustained effort to ensure that the 
occupied state ceases to represent a threat to the occupier and complies with its political 
demands. These demands can themselves involve a major transformation of domestic 
political institutions and policies – in essence, a change of regime. Once the occupier is in 
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place, however, the political regime becomes a distinctive one – while a period of 
occupation often coincides with a period of attempted regime change, it also itself 
represents the emergence of a new, internationalized regime that is distinct from what 
has come before and what will follow. International and domestic actors interact and the 
nature of domestic politics is systematically different from a conventional domestic 
political system.  
The international law of occupation holds that occupiers must respect the 
sovereignty of the occupied power and must make minimal changes to its political 
structures – the primary legal responsibility of international occupiers is to ensure 
political order at the national level while respecting domestic institutional and legal 
structures.34 In practice, however, this legal responsibility has often been abandoned in 
favour of a transformative agenda, in which the occupier seeks to make major alterations 
to domestic structures and often wields executive authority toward these ends. In doing 
so, international occupiers often play a major role in governing the territory they are 
occupying, and thus internationalize the previously domestic political regime.  
The US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, for example, exercised 
extensive governing authority and advanced an ambitious transformative agenda to alter 
the nature of Iraq’s economic and political systems. Its involvement went far beyond 
efforts to provide political order and instead concentrated on systematically changing 
Iraq’s political structures. The establishment of the CPA under the lead of a US 
Administrator introduced a new governing agent in Iraq that took precedence over pre-
existing domestic political authorities.35 The CPA enjoyed full executive and legislative 
authority, and involved itself in all major aspects of domestic politics. It used a broad 
range of mechanisms to influence the political process, and among other things the US 
political authorities chose their domestic interlocutors selectively, led the way in 
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institution building and involved themselves heavily in electoral issues, including the 
design of the electoral system.36 
Arguably the clearest examples of internationalized regimes in the context of 
international occupation can be found in the post-war cases of Germany and Japan, both 
of which experienced several years of external rule. In Japan, the US took the lead in the 
post-war occupation, and appointed General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers. As Supreme Commander from 1945 to 1951, 
MacArthur exercised a monopoly over both power and policy, and played a major 
individual role as the head of the occupation force that distinguished the US-led 
experience in Japan from the more collaborative and less personalized Allied occupation 
of Germany.37 The US objectives for the occupation were ambitious and highly political. 
They sought to bring about demilitarization and deindustrialization, while also purging 
the ruling class and establishing a peaceful and democratic government.38 Throughout 
the occupation, US officials made an extensive array of executive decisions and 
introduced wide-ranging political, economic and social reforms. These included the 
expansion of the franchise to women, the break-up of large industrial monopolies, the 
reform of the education and judicial systems and the imposition of a new, US-drafted 
constitution. Although many of these policies were implemented by the pre-existing 
Japanese bureaucracy, the executive decisions were made by the international occupiers 
rather than by any autonomous Japanese authorities.39 Consequently, the occupation 
period in Japan was much more than a transitional moment between domestic regime 
types, and instead represented a distinct system of international governance. For several 
years, the political system in Japan was led by international rather than domestic 
authorities, and executive decisions were taken by US rather than Japanese officials. The 
regime does not fit easily into existing typologies of regime type, and is best seen as a 
form of internationalized regime.  
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The international occupation of Germany also lasted several years, from 1945-49, 
and entailed the internationalization of a previously autonomous regime. The initial 
Allied presence in Germany from 1945 involved the division of Germany into separate 
zones, each headed by one of the Allied powers (the UK, the US, the Soviet Union and 
France). The separate zones were in turn overseen by the Allied Control Council, which 
was in charge of a range of inter-zone affairs, such as transport, finance, industry and 
trade. The initial goals of the occupation included military elements, especially 
demilitarization, as well as economic and political objectives such as, denazification, 
democratization and decartelization.40 Consequently, the occupying powers involved 
themselves heavily in the governance of Germany, intervening in local elections, 
establishing new political and economic institutions, and moulding the contours of 
Germany’s new domestic political landscape. Although divisions between the Allies soon 
led to the division of Germany, each set of occupiers exercised extensive political 
authority in their own areas of control. As Juan Linz has written of the Allied presence in 
the western zones, ‘the Allied high command in the western sectors implemented a 
controlled process of redemocratization defining the rules of the game, the timing of the 
process, excluding some potential political forces by limiting the number of parties, the 
Lizenparteien, and giving them a series of advantages which would assure the future 
strengths of some of them, at the same time that they exercised considerable influence 
on the constitutional framework, imposing their version of federalism and supporting a 
particular model of social economic organisation’.41 The cumulative effect of such 
actions in the western zones was to internationalize the political regime, creating a 
political system in which the core elements of the regime – its personnel, institutions and 
policies – were constituted in significant part by international as well as domestic actors.42 
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Internat ional  administrat ion 
The second form of international intervention is that of international administration, 
which involves international organizations assuming extensive and intrusive governing 
roles at the domestic level. In cases such as Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, 
international organizations have sought to address profound domestic challenges by 
assuming some or all governmental powers in a period of international state-building. 
International administration is similar to, but distinct from, state-led occupation of 
territory. While the two forms of intervention share significant commonalities, not least 
the direct involvement of international actors in domestic political and economic 
administration, they differ in relation to the nature of the international presence.43 While 
military occupation missions are generally state-led, and involve a single state or coalition 
of states occupying and administering a territory for a period time, international 
administration operations differ through the involvement and oversight of multilateral 
international organizations. These missions are not based purely on state action, but are 
both authorized and overseen by international bodies. This in turn can provide a greater 
level of accountability and legitimacy to international administrators, although this is not 
always the case.44 The UN in particular plays a key role here in establishing, supervising 
and directing international administration missions, but other international bodies are 
also involved, such as the Peace Implementation Council that has overseen the Office of 
the High Representative in Bosnia since 1995.45 This type of international intervention is 
not unique to the post-Cold War period, but it experienced a revival in the 1990s and 
represents one of the most robust forms of intervention by the international 
community.46 
The level of international intervention entailed in international administration results 
in a profound penetration of domestic politics by external actors, and the domestic 
regimes in which these administration missions take place become heavily 
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internationalized. In the three principal cases of international administration in the post-
Cold War period – Kosovo, Bosnia and East Timor - international administrators took a 
leading role in political governance and heavily structured the nature of the political 
regimes.  
The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was 
established in order to prepare for East Timor’s independence after nearly twenty-five 
years of Indonesian occupation, and provide security and humanitarian assistance in the 
aftermath of widespread violence surrounding the independence referendum in 1999. 
Authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNTAET was empowered with 
overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and the exercise of all 
legislative and executive authority, and was mandated to deal with a wide range of 
security, political and economic issues. Among other long-term goals, Security Council 
Resolution 1272 mandated the UN administration to ‘support capacity-building for self-
government’ and consult and cooperate with the East Timorese people on the 
‘development of local democratic institutions’.47 The UNTAET administration acted as 
East Timor’s government for nearly two years and undertook a wide range of executive 
decisions in the political sphere, establishing new political institutions, introducing new 
policies and setting the political agenda. Even after elections in 2001 led to the 
establishment of a Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution, the UN authorities 
continued to play a direct role in the governance of East Timor until full independence 
was achieved and UNTAET was withdrawn in May 2002. The UN administration always 
acted closely with domestic interlocutors and rarely imposed its decisions against 
domestic opposition, but it nonetheless wielded extensive political authority and 
fundamentally shaped the Timorese political system during its tenure.48  
Similarly, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
was mandated to address a wide range of issues, including some core post-conflict aims 
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such as troop withdrawal and demilitarization along with a number of explicitly political 
responsibilities such as promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-
government.49 The position of the Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) was given particularly strong powers, including full legislative and executive 
authority within Kosovo.50 As the highest civilian official within the UNMIK structure, 
the SRSG enjoyed full civilian executive authority, and could ‘change, repeal or suspend 
existing laws’, and had the ‘authority to appoint any person to perform functions in the 
interim civil administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, and to remove such 
persons if their service is found to be incompatible with the mandate and the purposes 
of the interim civil administration’.51 The UNMIK mission, thus, enjoyed extensive 
authority within Kosovo, and became a key part of its political regime. Although 
UNMIK established new domestic institutions of self-government, they nonetheless 
remained subordinate to the UN political structures. The political agenda was carefully 
limited, and contentious issues such as calls for an independence referendum and a full 
constitution for Kosovo were rebuffed. Conditionality was used also extensively to 
extract political concessions from the Kosovo Albanian political leadership and to ensure 
political development according to UN standards and benchmarks of progress.52  
While the operation in Bosnia was not a UN operation, it too entailed extensive 
executive international authority. The international presence in Bosnia was established on 
the basis of the Dayton Agreement, a comprehensive peace agreement that covered a 
wide range of political and military issues. Along with provisions relating to the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, the return of refugees and economic matters, the agreement 
included provisions for the establishment of an Office of the High Representative of the 
international community who would oversee the implementation of the civilian elements 
of the Dayton agreement.53 The lack of progress within Bosnia in the immediate post-
Dayton period prompted the international community to reinforce the powers of the 
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High Representative, giving the holder greater authority to take action in cases of 
violation of the agreement, or of resistance to international agenda. The new so-called 
‘Bonn Powers’ included the authority to enact legislation unilaterally and to appoint or 
dismiss public officials (including elected representatives), thus enshrining a strong 
international dimension to Bosnia’s political regime. In subsequent years the Bonn 
Powers were used extensively and Bosnia’s legislation, institutions and government 
personnel were all heavily shaped by international officials. Laws and institutions were at 
times imposed unilaterally by the High Representative, elected and unelected officials 
were vetted for office and at times dismissed from office, and the political agenda was 
heavily determined by international rather than domestic priorities.54  
In all three cases, the international missions used their powers extensively, and 
domestic actors were unable to pursue their political objectives without the involvement 
and oversight of external authorities. Consequently, international actors were in a 
position to set the political agenda, guide political development and structure the political 
choices available to national political actors. International veto power was used 
extensively in Bosnia and Kosovo in relation to legislative proposals by domestic actors, 
as well as in relation to ministerial appointments in Bosnia. Furthermore, all three cases 
highlighted the role that international administrators can play in drafting, and at times 
imposing, critical legislation and key political institutions. In each case, the outcome of 
such international intervention was the internationalization of the political regime itself. 
 
Informal empire  
The third setting of internationalized regimes is that of informal empire, where a state 
becomes subordinate to a major power and cedes much of its domestic authority. David 
A. Lake has identified two key features that distinguish informal empires from formal 
empires, in which a state is essentially annexed into a wider imperial power. The first is 
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that in the case of informal empire, the subordinate state retains its nominal sovereign 
status – it retains its international legal personality and is still recognized as an 
independent state in the international system. The second difference is that the 
subordinate state also retains a nominally independent government, so that some form of 
political regime remains even if it is dominated, and partially constituted, by an outside 
power.55 The clearest recent example of an informal empire is the Soviet control over 
Eastern European countries during the Cold War, in which Moscow deeply penetrated a 
range of regimes and strictly controlled their political agendas. The states in Central and 
Eastern Europe retained their legal sovereign status and their nominally independent 
domestic governments, but it was ultimately Soviet authority that dominated the political 
processes within many of their political regimes.  
Soviet control of its Eastern European satellite states was exercised through a 
number of levers, although the use and threat of force were factors common to all cases 
throughout the period of informal empire. Whatever the wishes of the western Allied 
powers might have been at the end of the war, not to mention the Eastern Europe states 
themselves, the presence of the Red Army gave the Soviet Union a de facto authority in 
the region that trumped any wartime Allied agreements or any considerations of popular 
consent.56 This military advantage was complemented with the use of other strategies, 
some of which were initially pioneered by Stalin within the Soviet Union in the 1920s 
and 1930s. The historian Seton-Watson has identified three stages by which Communist 
control was established in Eastern Europe. First, anti-Fascist coalitions emerged 
including both Communist and non-Communist parties, although Soviet authorities 
helped ensure that Communists attained key positions of power in government. Second, 
the Communists would begin to target their coalition partners and work to oust them 
from government, often using the police and judiciary to intimidate, arrest and imprison 
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key political leaders. Finally, the consolidation of a single party was achieved through 
political purges and the increasing use of coercive repression.57  
By the late 1940s, Soviet-backed governments were established throughout most of 
Central and Eastern Europe, and the political models of the region came to resemble 
almost precisely the model that existed in the Soviet Union.58 New constitutions were 
based on the Soviet Constitution, where government was dominated by the leading role 
of the Communist party, which in each country took its cue from the Moscow 
leadership. Economic planning was centralized and successive Five Year Plans were 
introduced to align the European economies to the Soviet model of collectivisation and 
heavy industrial output. Finally, each state developed an intelligence and police service 
comparable to, and subordinate to, the Soviet security apparatus.59 In the following years 
until Stalin’s death in 1953, Central and Eastern Europe was subject to a wave of Stalinist 
terror that included political purges, show trials, judicial executions and the wholesale 
transfer of a generation of politicians and intellectuals to prison, exile or forced labour 
camps. Although the political trajectory in each case was influenced by national 
particularities, there was an over-arching Moscow-driven strategic objective of 
Sovietisation that entailed institutional and ideological transfer, cultural regimentation, 
domestic terror, and foreign policy convergence.60 During this time, the political regimes 
within the Soviet Bloc existed in an uneasy state of hybridity, as domestic communist 
rulers enacted policies in a way that suggested meaningful domestic authority, but did so 
in a manner that was driven and circumscribed by Soviet authorities based in Moscow 
(or posted directly to Central and Eastern European capitals) that these political regimes 
were anything but domestically autonomous.  
Even after Stalin’s death, the relaxation of some of the harsher methods of 
repression did not translate into any meaningful political liberalisation. Once established, 
the Soviet informal empire in Central and Eastern Europe was maintained through a 
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range of mechanisms. The threat and use of force was arguably the most important 
leverage that Moscow exercised in the region, and the early role for the Red Army in the 
immediate post-war period was supplemented later by the Soviet invasions of Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968 respectively, which both confirmed the continued 
grip that Moscow held and also helped ensure continued acquiescence throughout the 
Soviet Bloc. Although political leaders within the satellite states enjoyed greater 
autonomy from Moscow in domestic affairs, these interventions demonstrated that there 
was no scope for political development within these regimes that deviated in any 
meaningful way from the single-party system espoused by Soviet authorities.61 The states 
of Central and Eastern Europe that had once been fully compliant satellite states were no 
longer so fully subordinate, but they were not fully autonomous states either, and the 
Soviet Union continued to set clear boundaries on their political affairs.62 
The informal empire in Central and Eastern Europe, thus, gave rise to a set of 
internationalized regimes that retained sovereign status and national governments, yet 
were deeply penetrated by Soviet authorities in key areas of domestic politics. Political 
elites, political rules and political policies were all contingent on Moscow’s approval, and 
while each of these regimes enjoyed some level of autonomy in governing daily life in 
their territories, they enjoyed it only at the discretion of a foreign power. These Soviet 
satellite states were legally independent, but politically subservient, and their political 
regimes, thus, deviated from conventional type (in this case, totalitarianism) by virtue of 
their hybrid nature. Politics in these countries was not domestically determined, and as a 
result they cannot be considered as conventional domestic political regimes.  
 
 
The arenas of internationalization 
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In all of these settings, international actors have exercised levels of political authority that 
go beyond conventional international influence on domestic affairs – in these settings, 
international actors have partially constituted the national level political regime. Political 
regimes have traditionally been defined with reference to three key domestic factors: the 
number and type of actors who are allowed to gain access to government power, the 
methods of access to such positions, and the rules that are followed in the making of 
publicly binding decisions.63 In internationalized regimes, each of these elements of the 
regime is shaped in important ways by the international presence.  
First, the number and type of actors is distinct in internationalized regimes. Along 
side the pre-existing set of domestic elites, a new set of international elites is added that 
increases the ranks of the political landscape. More important than the number of elites, 
however, is the identity of these elites. International actors are inherently different from 
domestic actors, even if carrying out apparently similar functions. As Killick has 
highlighted with reference to international aid provision, international and domestic 
authorities retain separate identities and interests for several reasons. First, they have 
different histories and political origins, which can lead outside actors to apply ahistorical 
models without regard to important domestic historical legacies. Second, the 
constituencies they need to satisfy are also separate, with domestic actors having to 
address the demands of local electorates, while international authorities are often 
accountable to their own constituents, or in the case of international organisations, to 
individual member states that in turn have their own domestic electorates to consider. 
Finally, international actors do not have to live with the long-term consequences of their 
actions, and thus frequently have different views regarding the risk and desirability of 
political change.64 These considerations suggest that the nature of political leadership is 
quite distinct in the context of internationalized regimes than it is from conventional 
regime types. 
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The second distinct element of internationalized regimes concerns the methods used 
for accessing political power. In conventional domestic regimes, these methods depend 
on the openness of the political system. In democracies, power is accessed through free 
and fair elections, and there is direct public involvement in the selection and replacement 
of political elites. In non-democracies, leaders are generally chosen by the military or a 
single ruling party and in some cases by hereditary secession rather than by considered 
selection.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Types of Political Regime65 
 
Attributes 
 
 
Regime Types 
Number and Type 
of Actors Allowed 
Access to Power 
Methods of Access 
to Power 
Rules for Making 
Publicly Binding 
Decisions 
Democratic Many Actors: 
Leaders of multiple 
political parties  
Regular free and fair 
elections 
Checks and 
Balances 
Authoritarian Few Actors: Leaders 
of military and 
business elite 
Decisions within 
military 
Bounded 
arbitrariness  
Totalitarian  One Actor: leader 
of single party 
Decisions within 
single party 
Unbounded 
arbitrariness 
Internationalized  
 
Domestic and 
international actors 
Decisions of foreign 
states or 
international 
organizations  
Bounded 
arbitrariness: Some 
legal restrictions but 
not always followed. 
Few checks and 
balance on 
international power  
 
In the case of internationalized regimes, however, a significant element of domestic 
power is held by those who are selected by non-national bodies. A critical feature of 
most internationalized regimes is that executive authority is held by elites who are 
international appointees – they are usually non-nationals, selected and deployed by 
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foreign states or international organizations rather than being elected or selected by 
domestic constituencies. In cases of international occupation, occupying states usually 
appoint one of their own senior officials to act as an authority figure at the domestic 
level. For example, the US appointed General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers in post-war Japan, and appointed Ambassador Paul 
Bremer as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in 2003. In the case of 
international administration of territory, the most senior international appointees are 
usually distinguished diplomats from countries other than the administered territory. For 
example, the UN has appointed senior civil administrators in both East Timor and 
Kosovo in the role of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. Other 
international organizations have played similar roles in appointing influential 
international officials. The European Union has deployed authoritative international 
actors in Kosovo through its EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), and the 
powerful High Representative in Bosnia is appointed by the Peace Implementation 
Council, an ad hoc international body created after the Dayton Agreement was signed in 
1995. Only in the setting of informal empire is direct appointment of non-nationals 
eschewed in favour of outside control over an indigenous and subservient government. 
In such contexts, the intervening power relies instead on compliance and collaboration 
from proxy authorities. The government in the subordinate regime may be legally 
independent, but the reality of political control from outside ensures that its decisions are 
not entirely its own and that the regime is internationalized rather than truly domestic.66 
Finally, the third element of a regime that is distinctive in these settings is the body 
of rules that govern the making of publicly binding decisions. Here, the conventional 
distinction in the literature has concerned the balance between the arbitrary use of power 
and the establishment of constitutional restraints on political decision-making.67 In 
democratic regimes, a system of checks and balances exists to ensure that decision-
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making is routinized and takes place within certain constraints. Executives are 
accountable to legislatures, decisions are often subject to some form of judicial review, 
and political leaders are, thus, restricted in the extent to which they can use their power 
for their own ends.68 In contrast, non-democratic regimes usually involve much lower 
levels of constitutional restraint, and political leaders are much freer to use their authority 
as they see fit. This can range from quite routine and stable decision-making in some 
forms of authoritarian rule such as military regimes to highly arbitrary forms of decision-
making in totalitarian or personalistic regimes.69  
In internationalized regimes, external actors are sometimes subject to certain 
restraints but they are also often able to make binding decisions in ways usually not 
available in most democratic regimes. In settings of informal empire, international actors 
are usually free from significant restrictions on their actions as their authority is based on 
their surplus of power over the subordinate state. In settings of occupation and 
administration, restraints exist that are designed to curb international behaviour, but that 
frequently fail to do so. These restraints include the role of international law in the case 
of international occupation, as well as authorizing mandates in the case of international 
administration. Under international law, occupying powers are restricted from 
significantly altering domestic conditions and are obliged to maintain the status quo 
rather than undertake wholesale changes in political structures and government.70 
International administration missions are also usually established through a mandate that 
has legal force and that identifies their legal authority and political objectives. These 
mandates, thus, set out what the international officials can and cannot do, and range 
from being relatively restrictive to being robust in their allocation of wide-ranging 
powers to external administrators.71  
In theory, therefore, international officials in these settings have clearly demarcated 
roles and are subjected to fixed limits on their decision-making abilities. In practice, 
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however, there is often a high degree of flexibility in their use of power, and these 
external elites can often act without significant constraints. Many occupation missions 
have simply ignored their legal obligations and pursued explicit and ambitious 
transformative agendas.72 Occupations in Germany, Japan and Iraq have had explicit and 
ambitious political goals that entailed major alterations to domestic political systems. 
Similarly, some international administration missions have assumed powers that have not 
been expressly granted to them. The clearest example is the High Representative in 
Bosnia, which was a post initially, established in 1995 to co-ordinate the international 
civilian missions created in the Dayton Accords. However, in the early post-Dayton years 
political progress lagged badly behind international expectations, and the High 
Representative gained approval from the Peace Implementation Council for a re-
interpretation of its authority to include the power to enact legislation and dismiss local 
elected and administrative officials. The resulting ‘Bonn Powers’ fundamentally changed 
the nature of the international mission, and provided it with a level of authority that had 
not been approved by any of the national political parties. Subsequent High 
Representatives used these assumed powers regularly, enacting large volumes of 
legislation and dismissing several high profile elected politicians.73  
In internationalized regimes, therefore, the rules for making publicly binding 
decisions are either entirely lacking, or are limited in their restrictive powers. Where such 
rules exist, they are easily bypassed and international elites rarely subject themselves to 
the kinds of checks and balances usually associated with democratic political systems. 
Politics in these settings is, thus, different from politics in conventional domestic 
contexts. International and domestic actors coexist, and political outcomes are the results 
of their interaction on the national stage. These regimes can vary in their degree of 
political competitiveness and openness, and also in the degree to which political 
outcomes are determined by outside actors. But they all share the feature that 
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international actors play such a central role in domestic politics that they cease to be 
purely democratic regimes – external actors help constitute the political system in each of 
its core arenas, and these regimes are internationalized as a result. 
 
 
Conclusion: The implications of internationalization 
 
Scholarship to date has used domestic criteria to distinguish between different forms of 
domestic political regime.74 This is hardly a surprise, as the very concept of a political 
regime has been widely understood to refer to a domestic-level political system. Yet 
while the resulting regime typologies cover most cases in the world, they do not cover all. 
Recent events in places as geographically and politically diverse as Iraq, Bosnia and East 
Timor show how international forces can alter the nature of national regimes and in the 
process internationalize them into new forms. Such internationalized regimes are distinct 
because they reflect a dimension of hybridity that has so far been overlooked. The hybrid 
regimes identified in recent research are hybrid due to their combination of domestic 
elements usually found in distinct regime types – they share aspects of democratic and 
non-democratic politics. Internationalized regimes, however, reflect a separate dimension 
of hybridity that entails the combination of usually distinct national and international 
level politics. In these settings, international actors play such an extensive role in national 
politics that the regime essentially ceases to be purely domestic.  
Internationalized regimes are not widespread, but they are important cases and 
deserve focused attention. They have emerged at regular intervals, and recent years have 
seen a spike in international efforts to shape the domestic affairs of others through 
intrusive and prolonged intervention. Such efforts not only influence the lives of those 
who live within these political systems, but also tell us about the potential for, and 
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implications of, international influence over domestic politics. The utility of identifying 
and exploring a set of internationalized regimes, thus, derives not just from the ability to 
amend existing typologies and classify cases accordingly, but also from the potential it 
provides for theory building. Typologies of regime types have been helpful for advancing 
theory as well as developing concepts and classifying cases, and regime type has been 
associated with a number of political outcomes.75 Brownlee, for example, has pointed to 
the independent explanatory power of regime types, and especially hybrid regimes, in 
accounting for the likelihood of successful democratization.76 Hadenius and Teorell have 
also highlighted the relationship between regime type on one hand and regime duration 
and transition on the other. In particular, they demonstrate that different regimes are 
associated with different patterns of regime duration, and that different types of 
authoritarian regime are also likely to give rise to different regime transition outcomes.77 
The separate implications of different regime types are the result of their distinct 
characteristics, such as their organizational structures, the extent of their experience of 
elections, and the incentives they entail for political leaders. In particular, much of the 
explanatory power ascribed to regime types concerns the nature of political leadership 
within the regime and the incentives that these leaders have to retain, or possibly 
relinquish, political power.78 The relatively short duration of military regimes, for 
example, is seen to be the result of the military’s ability to secure a role for itself after 
leaving power – militaries have different incentives about the maintenance of power 
from the leaders of one-party regimes and personalist dictatorships, who view regime 
change as a much greater existential threat. 
It follows, therefore, that the incentive structures within internationalized regimes will 
also have implications for the duration and trajectory of these political systems. 
Moreover, as the political elites in these systems include international as well as domestic 
actors, it also follows that the set of incentives and leadership dynamics in 
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internationalized regimes will be distinct from those in more conventional cases, and may 
therefore have different implications for regime outcomes. In order to understand these 
separate dynamics, it is necessary to take the incentives structures and organizational 
structures of international regimes into account, and to consider the different roles that 
both states and international organization play in shaping regime development. In these 
settings, both regime duration and transition trajectories will partly be a function of the 
identity, ideological outlook and organizational structure of the international authority 
that has internationalized the regime in question. Consequently, some internationalized 
regimes may have quite different future prospects than other more conventional cases 
due to the international presence. In the same way that militaries have different 
incentives from dominant political parties, so too might states have different incentives 
from international organizations, and democracy promoting interveners have different 
incentives from democracy suppressing interveners. The Soviet interference in Central 
and Eastern Europe, for example, was significantly motivated by a view in Moscow that 
liberalization in the Soviet Bloc would be a political threat to one party rule within the 
Soviet Union itself. The incentives within Moscow therefore led to policies that ensured 
a lengthy internationalization of the satellite states, in contrast with far shorter periods of 
internationalization in cases where the international interveners have been democratic 
states which have not had the same kind of incentive to resist the emergence of 
autonomous and democratic political regimes. Further research is required to establish 
and test the full range of implications of internationalization of political regimes, and in 
particular their effects on regime duration and transition prospects. The concept of 
internationalized regimes may not only help in conceptualizing and classifying the 
disparate array of political systems in the world, but may also have use in theorizing 
about the crucial relationship between regime type and regime trajectories. 
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